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Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society

Global Flows, Head Scarves, and
Finite Freedom: Tillich on
Globalization
Jonathan Rothchild
This paper probes Paul Tillich’s conceptions of
freedom and nationalism and their significance for
current expressions in globalized contexts. There are
three central sections of the paper: (1) an analysis of
various features of globalization through the works
of Arjun Appadurai, Saskia Sassen, Amy Chua, and
Amartya Sen; (2) an examination of Tillich’s writings on freedom and nationalism in his 1933 The
Socialist Decision and his later works; and (3) an
investigation of a case study, the recent legislation
banning conspicuous religious symbols in French
public schools, and possible Tillichian rejoinders.
My thesis holds that Tillich’s reflections remain instructive for the present globalized contexts because
they protect an irreducible selfhood and freedom
(tantamount to a transcendent imperative over concrete circumstances), yet they also affirm this selfhood and freedom as shaped by others (manifested
as participation within relationships and communities). Tillich encapsulates these claims in a participation-transcendence dynamic that bears the seriousness of a moral imperative without relinquishing
attention to the concrete situation.
Section One: Themes in Globalization
The understandings of globalization vary markedly,1 but a frequently identified feature is the interpenetration between the global and the local. Sociologist Roland Robertson, for example, has stated
that “globalization—in the broadest sense, the compression of the world—has involved and increasingly involves the creation and the incorporation of
locality, processes which themselves largely shape,
in turn, the compression of the world as a whole.”2
This compression of local and global expresses the
fluidity of freedom and selfhood within a postnational world; more dramatically, this fluidity becomes manifested as conflict. As Saskia Sassen puts
it, “[g]lobalization is a process that generates contradictory spaces, characterized by contestation, internal differentiation, continuous border crossings.”3
The balkanization of these contradictory spaces appears prominently in the global city, and Sassen analyzes the concrete implications of spaces of powerlessness. The juxtaposition of power and powerlessness can erode social justice when manual laborers,
principally women and immigrants, “are never represented as part of the global economy, [even if]
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they are in fact part of the infrastructure of jobs involved in running and implementing the global economic system.”4 Though they serve an irreplaceable
function in the global economy, service workers in
the global city are rendered invisible by economic
structures that instrumentalize labor and destabilize
and vitiate individual identities and freedoms.
In addressing such phenomena, anthropologist
Arjun Appadurai describes our decolonized worlds
in terms of social imagination and constellations of
global flows. Global flows express the disjunctures
and de-territorialization that increasingly compel
individuals to re-imagine their own identities and
freedoms. Appadurai insists that the Weberian
presuppositions about ethnicity as grounded
principally in biological and genealogical kinship
must be abandoned in favor of a view of ethnicity
that “takes the conscious and imaginative
construction and mobilization of difference as its
core.”5 Whether manifested as ethnoscapes,
mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, or
ideoscapes, disjunctive, but ubiquitous global flows
impact these imaginative constructions by blurring
and
exploding
traditional boundaries
and
preconceptions.
Appadurai
denominates
transnational cultural movements—funded by
international migration—as “diasporic public
spheres.”6 Within these diasporic spheres lies “the
nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the
bottle of the territorial state, [which] is now itself
diasporic.”7 Weberian conceptions of nationalism
and ethnicity as aggregate natural facts are superseded by nationalism and ethnicity as freedom and
identities produced by the collective imagination.
The blunting of such imagination has reductive
ramifications, for it obviates collective identity and
individual self-formation (Bildung). Tillich had anticipated such deleterious ramifications in contemplating die Judenfrage in 1953: “The individual human being who belongs to a nation or to a race is no
longer regarded as an individual. One sees the individual only through the image of the type…Such
stereotyping…was disastrous for the relationship
8
between
the Germans
and the Jews.”
If collective
imagination
underlies
nationalism,
we must probe the relationship between freedom and
nationalism, particularly freedom as construed in
utilitarian terms of rational choice theory and wealth
maximization by neo-classical economics. Here the
biases of Western sensibilities confront a global
world of marginalized, displaced, and heterogeneous
persons. Amy Chua disabuses views that promote
free-market democracy as the definitive strategy for
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creating a secure and productive society in a globalized context: “Because markets and democracy
benefit different ethnic groups in societies [with
market-dominant minorities], the pursuit of free
market democracy produces highly unstable and
combustible conditions.”9 Chua points, for example,
to Filipino Chinese who, though just 1 to 2 percent
of the population, hold controlling interest in the
principal commercial banks, department store
chains, and major supermarkets of the Philippines.10
She examines similar phenomena in the case studies
of Brazil, Cameroon, and Russia as well as, on a
broader context, anti-American sentiment. Chua
does not espouse anti-democratic principles, but she
cautions that democracy as presently conceived and
implemented—that is, driven by a proposed synthesis between market-driven economics and democratically-achieved consensus—cannot sustain freedom and flourishing because majorities do not adequately participate in these processes. This disenfranchisement of majorities has induced ethnic hatred and violence, but it has also attenuated the links
between material, market goods and national identity: “A principal focus of nationalist and ethnonationalist anti-market reactions in the non-Western
world has been the humiliating domination by ‘outsiders’ of a nation’s economic symbols: oil wells in
Latin America, gold mines in South Africa, forests
in Burma and Indonesia, Lomonosov porcelain in
Russia, or other sectors that have come symbolically
to be associated with national identity.”11 Chua recommends that democracies and markets that expand
participation, particularly ways that expand ownership among the poor,12 can reconnect nationalism
and freedom in ways that promote justice. We will
see below the extent to which Tillich promotes democracy as a critical corrective to purely nationalistic impulses, but a corrective that itself be restrained
by the imperatives of justice.
Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen also
argues that our globalized context necessitates the
rethinking the nature of freedom. Rather than construe freedom in neoclassical or utilitarian terms as
achievement, Sen holds that conceptions of freedom
should attend to “the processes that allow freedom
of actions and decisions, and the actual opportunities
that people have, given their personal and social circumstances.”13 Similar to Chua,14 Sen envisages
freedom as a capacious set of social and political
individual opportunities broadly conceived as capabilities. Sen’s capabilities approach acutely recognizes the significance of moral values and nonmoral
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goods, and, consequently, the importance of transforming social perceptions about market and nonmarket freedoms. Sen posits that a sense of justice—
a sense discarded by the separation of fact and value
by neo-classical and utilitarian models of economics—can be a decisively motivating factor for economic action: “Social values can play—and have
played—an important part in the success of various
forms of social organization, including the market
mechanism, democratic politics, elementary civil
and political rights, provision of basic public goods,
and institutions for public action and protest.”15 Sen
points to the Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh,
which not only afford women more substantial financial opportunities but also enable them to participate more fully in social and economic affairs,
thereby effectuating social change and redressing
imbalanced power dynamics.16
Section Two: Tillich’s ParticipationTranscendence Dynamic
In his 1933 text, The Socialist Decision, suppressed by the newly entrenched Nazis, Tillich
fleshes out the disparate roots of nationalism. Gregory Baum remarks that, “Tillich was one of the few
anti-fascist writers of the thirties on who did not oppose nationalism on principle.”17 Tillich’s perspective, as Jean Richard notes, must be qualified and
nuanced. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich develops
a trenchant critique of the bourgeois and romantic
elements of nationalism, but he also censures present
forms of socialism. Tillich develops a social theory
that distinguishes two types of consciousness, consciousness of origin and consciousness of demand.
In my reading, the former pertains to participation,
or freedom shaped in and through relationships and
communities, and the latter pertains to transcendence, or a transcendent imperative over external
circumstances. This dynamic helps illuminate our
earlier discussion of freedom as participation in a
global context, but it also contributes the unique dimension of transcendence.
The Socialist Decision touches upon one aspect
of the participation-transcendence dynamic, namely,
the historical and universal character of the socialist
principle. The socialist principle instantiates this dynamic because it “is a particular principle”18 yet “is
rooted in the primordial human element.”19 Put differently, bearing the influence of Heidegger, Tillich
submits that “[t]he universal and the particular element—human being [Sein] and the proletarian existence [Dasein]—therefore do stand alongside each
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other in an unrelated way.”20 This relationship creates tension, but, unlike political romanticism that is
fettered by contradiction or “the subjective, accidental, arbitrary elements in that which contradicts itself,”21 the socialist principle experiences conflict—
and here Tillich appropriates Schelling’s abyss and
Kant’s antinomy that locate conflict in freedom itself—conflict that “is not rooted in the knowing subject, in the accidental and arbitrary, but in the thing
itself.”22 The conflict of socialism lies in the fact that
it seeks to “break through national limitations”23 but
in a way that “is dependent for its own realization on
national powers of origin.”24 Socialism converts itself when it does not fully repudiate the consciousness of origin, maintains its “rational form”25 and
therefore avoids the tendency to relapse into “utopianism,”26 but challenges critically in and through its
prophetic character. Socialism’s prophetic character,
instantiated in the Hebrew prophets’ impassioned
pleas for righteousness and justice or Marx’s resistance to objectification, preserves freedom because it
marshals “the counter-movement against this process of dehumanization, against the tendency of capitalism to turn people into psychological mechanisms
calculable pleasure-pain reactions.”27
The prophetic character of socialism becomes
critical in its demand for justice that expands participation.28 The powers of origin are interrogated, restrained, and transformed by the critical corrective of
democracy, which itself is radicalized and restrained.
As Tillich writes, “[t]he construction of the socialist
state must be carried out within the tension between
the powers of origin that support the structure of
society and the democratic corrective that subjects it
to the demand of justice.”29 In unifying power and
justice, particular and universal converge in a necessarily perduring tension that one transcends, but
from which one does not fully separate.30 Jean Richard, who, like Gregory Baum, applies the insights of
The Social Decision to contemporary discussions of
the Province of Quebec and Canadian nationalism,
envisages an analogy between the nation and the
family. Jesus’ prophetic critique reconfigures the
family into a more inclusive model of neighbor love,
where the family “is broken but it is not abolished
nor eliminated. It is broken in so far as it is opened
to a wider, more universal dimension.”31 To be sure,
upon coming to the United States, Tillich evacuates
his earlier language of central planning and the utopian ideals of socialism; nevertheless, he retains socialism’s vision of the prophetically critical universal dimension. The smaller community of the nation
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remains present, but it is transmuted into a more inclusive notion of the reunion of the whole.
In later writings, Tillich continues to expatiate
on the dynamic of participation and transcendence
with respect to freedom and nationalism. In undertaking an extended historical excursus of courage
vis-à-vis participation and individualization, Tillich
in the Courage To Be juxtaposes, on the one hand,
the mythologization of participation, including the
“relapse to tribal collectivism [that] was readily visible in Nazism,”32 and, on the other hand, the denial
of participation, including the “romantic irony [that]
elevated the individual beyond all content and made
him empty: he was no longer obliged to participate
in anything seriously.”33 Tillich later identifies the
individuation-participation dynamic as one of the
ontological polarities in his Systematic Theology.
Transcendence also remains central to his analysis of
nationalism because nationalism can assume the
form of ultimacy.34 This ultimacy frequently becomes demonic when nationalism “claims infinity
without having it.”35 Tillich conflates nationalism
and the demonic when writing in 1938 during the
zenith of Nazi power: “At the present time nationalism is the most evident and the most dangerous incarnation of the demonic principle in general, especially where, as in various places, it has assumed an
explicitly religious form.”36 Nationalism signifies the
collective consciousness of origin, but the critical
consciousness of the prophetic voices necessitates
transformation and transcendence. Tillich preserves
the tension of the participation-transcendence dynamic when he defends the irreducible value of
German nationalism in the postwar context. Writing
in 1944, he upholds the prerogatives of German sovereignty and integrity: “But if Germany is divided
into three sovereign nations…then the greatest irredenta in world history will be created.”37 These two
passages, one condemning the demonic character of
nationalism and the other affirming the selfdetermination of Germany, illustrate the complexity
of the participation-transcendence dynamic.

Section Three: Headscarves, Secularity, and
Religious Freedom
In 1905, France ratified the Law of Separation,
where Article One of the Constitution affirmed
France as a republic, indivisible, secular, democratic,
and social, and resolved the issue of church and
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state. The pursuit of secularity, laïcité, enabled
France to disentangle itself from perceived Catholic
coercion. Nearly one hundred years later, the government imposed a ban on conspicuous religious
symbols in public schools, or neutral spaces, which
was, according to a Chirac spokesperson, “a decision
that respects our history, our customs, and our values...To do nothing would be irresponsible. It would
be wrong.”38 Critics point to the ambiguity of the
term “conspicuous” as politically motivated, given
that it allows smaller Christian crosses but disallows
the larger Islamic headscarves and Sikh turbans. The
five million Muslims in France, roughly eight percent of the population and expanding, have demonstrated, but largely complied with the ban since its
enactment into law this past September.
The meaning of the veil, particularly its reemergence in the last few decades, has generated
polemical debates: is it repressive to Muslim
women, a tool of patriarchy, or is it a symbolic vehicle for Muslim women to reclaim their Islamic identity and retain respectability in an increasingly secularized world? The confounding problem of otherness, eloquently articulated by Edward Said and others, continues to exacerbate understandings between
Western and Arab views of freedom. Frequent misunderstandings regarding hijab (religious modesty)
through veiling such as reductionism problematize
these debates and obfuscate the tremendous diversity
of cultures of the Arab Middle East, including different forms of veils. I cannot adequately address
such debates here, but our earlier discussion of contradictory spaces again becomes relevant. Through
interviews with Muslim women of varying ages,
nationalities, and life-situations, Helen Watson argues that such narratives illustrate the ways “[e]ach
woman is ‘caught between worlds’ in the sense of
facing conflicting pressures and managing competing cultural values, tradition and persons aspirations.”39 The interstitial space between worlds, what
Tillich identified as the boundary, reflects the intersection of traditional values and globalized contexts.
Given his interest in participation and transcendence as well as remarks about the perils and necessity of nationalism, how might Tillich respond to the
banning of religious symbols in public schools? Tillich’s writings on religion and nationalism attract the
attention of many thinkers, including the United
States Supreme Court which consulted Tillich’s
writings to adjudicate the claims of conscientious
objectors in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).40 Tillich would be attentive to the implica-
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tions of the ban as part of his theology of culture: “A
theology which does not deal seriously with the
criticism of religion by secular thought and some
particular forms of secular faith, such as liberal humanism, nationalism, and socialism, would be ‘akairos’—missing the demand of the historical moment.”41 Does the kairos compel us to consider the
ban as disclosive of the meaning of participation in a
polycentric and deliberatively secular society? Tillich’s concerns regarding the ban would pertain to
the blunting of depth-content and self-formation and
the envisioned separations between culture, morality, and religion. Self-transcendence occurs in and
through participation, but, in light of our earlier
analysis of globalization and Tillich’s own reflections, this participation cannot be limited to the nation: “There is no self-transcendence under the dimension of the spirit without the constitution of the
moral self by the unconditional imperative, and this
self-transcendence cannot take form except within
the universe of meaning created in the cultural
act.”42 The ban not only fractures culture and religion, but it also seeks to eliminate the interpenetration
of participation and transcendence.
Tillich calls the denial of the symbols that express ultimate concern—symbols that reconfigure
freedom and self-formation as transcendent but mediated by participation—a sacramental social attitude. In his 1923 “Basic Principles of Religious Socialism,” he writes: “The personality is completely
dominated by sacramental relations to the soil, possessions, the family, the tribe, the class, the nation,
and the politico-cultic hierarchy.”43 The demand for
justice, heard in the prophetic critique of justice and
expressed as the moral imperative, enjoins neutrality, but this neutrality cannot, according to Tillich,
remove risk, courage, or doubt. In Dynamics of
Faith, Tillich discusses two cases, one where society
and the community of faith are nearly identical and
one where they are distinct. In the rare case of the
former, Tillich explains that if “[civil authorities] try
to enforce spiritual conformity and are successful
they have removed the risk and courage which belong to the act of faith.”44 In the case of latter, which
resembles the situation in France, Tillich points to a
common denominator that holds different religious
groups together in a democratic society; he cautions
that this denominator may be constitutionally upheld
but that it cannot usurp ultimate concern:
This denominator may be more secular or more
religious. In any case it is an outgrowth of faith,
and its expression—as in the American Consti-
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tution—is affirmed in an attitude which sometimes has the unconditional character of an ultimate concern, but more often the conditional
character of a preliminary concern of the highest
degree. Just for this reason the civil authorities
should not try to prohibit the expression of doubt
about such a basic law, although they must enforce the legal consequences of it.45
The ban on religious symbols prohibits expressions of doubt and courage and, with them, the possibility of self-criticism. Tillich’s development of the
participation-transcendence dynamic upholds freedom as uniquely experienced but determined in and
through relationality, community, and the experience
of ultimate concern. Freedom becomes actualized as
an imperative that, though transcendent, calls us to
be who we are as we self-critically transform ourselves in our globalized contexts.46
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